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METALMANUFACTURES, N.E.S.
Trade
Germany was the leading exporter in the miscellaneous metal manu-
factures division as a whole, followed by the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Japan, in that order (Table 11.1).TheUnited
States maintained a lead in several subgroups, however, particularly in
finished structural parts and structures (SITC 691) and in containers
(SITC 692). France accounted for more than 10 per cent of exports in
these two groups and in household equipment of base metal (SITC
697), and Belgium-Luxembourg was the largest exporter of all in wire
products (SITC 693) at $48 million, leading Germany, the next in
importance, by more than 30 per cent.
For the most part, this division, which is a miscellany of products not
closely related in use or manufacture, consists of commodities which
have not undergone major innovations in either design or production
methods during the years covered here. A possible exception might be
the finished structural parts group, in which some of the items, such as
oil drilling structures and prefabricated buildings, underwent considerable
improvements in design.
Aside from the price data, discussed later in this chapter, and the
trade data, which show the United States to have been a net importer
in several of the groups, the weakness of the U.S. competitive position
in division 69 is suggested by the -many complaints of injury from
imports and demands for escape-clause investigations made by U.S.
companies, on such products as wood screws (SITC 694), axes and
Note: SITC 69. Value of OECD exports in 1963: $2.5 billion; 5.7 per cent of study
total. Coverage: Finished structural parts and structures, containers, wire products and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































axheads (SITC 695),stainless-steeltable flatware, scissors and shears
(SITC 696), straight pins, and safety pins (SITC 698).1
Another view of the U.S. trade position in this group is given by data
on the ratios of exports and imports to output. Some of the latter ratios
were substantial, as can be seen in Table 11.2. The matching of trade
to output data is not perfect and does not cover all the products in
this division but does include most of the important ones. In two of
the items frequently mentioned as being subject to severe foreign com-
petition on the U.S. market, steel nails and spikes and some cutlery,
imports supplied 15 per cent or more of the domestic market, but in
wire products, a frequent subject for complaint, the ratios of imports
to output plus imports were below 8 per cent.
As was pointed out in Chapter 9, the import ratios that are usually
quoted are larger than those of Table 11.2 because the commodity
breakdown is finer and the items most subject to foreign competition are
therefore more clearly pinpointed and because the data usually cited are
based on tonnage rather than value. The use of tonnage exaggerates the
importance of imports because the imports tend to be of lower average
value per ton than U.S. production; that is, they consist mainly of the
least fabricated types of steel products.2 Some idea of the overall effect
of using tonnage rather than value is given by the comparison of ratios
for the total of steel mill products. The tonnage ratio for steel mill
products as a whole was 7.3 per cent in while the value ratio for
total blast furnace, steel mill, and electrometallurgical products plus.
fabricated wire products was about 4 per cent (see source to Table 11.2).
The value ratio, it should be added, tends to understate the importance
1 U.S. Tariff Commission, Wood Screws of Iron or Steel: Report to the President on
Escape-Clause Investigation No. 34 ..., October1954; Axes and Axe-Heads: Report
on Escape-Clause Investigation No. 76..., May1959; Stainless-Steel Table Flatware:
Report to the President on Escape-Clause Investigation No. 61...,January1958,
and later reports on the same product; Scissors and Shears, and Manicure and Pedicure
Nippers, and Parts Thereof: Report to the President on investigation No. 24 .
March1954, and later reports on the same products; Straight (Dressmakers' or Com-
mon) Pins: Report to the President on Escape-Clause Investigation No. 7-109.
T.C.Pub. 52, February 1962; Safety Pins: Report to the President (1962) under Execu-
tive Order 10401, T.C. Pub. 46, January 1962, and later reports on the same product.
2 Tonnage data for wire products (U.S. imports as a percentage of apparent con-
swnption, 1964) often cited as examples of import competition
Wire nails and staples 48.8%
Barbed wire 47.9
Woven wire fence 27.9
The data are taken from Foreign Trade Trends, Iron and Steel, American Iron and
Steel Institute, 1967, p. 67.
8 Ibid., p. 65.Metal Manufactures, n.e.s. 273
Table 11.3
OECD Exports of Metal Manufactures, n.e.s., 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(dollars in millions)
Share in OECD Exports (per cent)
Value of EEC
OECD ExportsOECDU.S.U.K.TotalGermanyJapan
INCLUDING SWITZERLAND AND SPAIN
1964 $2,828 100.019.114.345.6 22.7 8.3
1963 100.019.714.845.6 22.7 8.0
1962 2,358 100.020.416.145.0 22.6 7.5
1961 2,217 100.019.616.646.2 23.6 6.9
EXCLUDING SWITZERLAND AND SPAIN
1961 2,166 100.020.016.947.3 24.2 7.1
1957 1,747 100.022.320.643.1 22.4 4.1
1953 1,144 100.023.024.940.5 19.8 2.5
Source: Appendix B.
of imports, to the extent that the lower value per ton of the imports is a
consequence of lower prices rather than lower quality or product mix.
Exports of metal manufactures, n.e.s. (that is, SITC division 69 as a
whole) more than doubled between 1953 and 1964 (Table 11.3). The
United States almost held its share of the export market after 1961
following losses in the earlier years, while the U.K. share declined
throughout the period. Germany gained sharply before 1961, and Japan
increased its share of OECD exports in every year. The most pervasive
shifts in export shares among the individual commodity groups within
division 69 were the losses by the United States and the United Kingdom
and gains by Japan and Canada. Germany and France lost ground in
more cases than they gained, while Sweden, and the EEC countries
other than Germany and France showed more gains than losses.
Some of these shifts resulted from nonprice factors. For example, in
metal containers (SITC 692), one obstacle to international trade and
competition was the existence of safety regulations, such as those of
the Interstate Commerce Commission in the United States. In some
cases, products that were acceptable to the purchaser could not be
bought for the United States or for countries adopting U.S. standards
because the regulatory agencies were slow to accept new technological274 Product Reports
Table 11.4
International Prices, Metal Manufactures, n.e.s., 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962=100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
U.s. 86 98 98 100 100 102
U.K. 90 101 103 100 99 103
EEC 87 99 100 100 97 98
Germany 84 93 98 100 99 101
Japan NA NA 98 100 93 101
Source: Appendix C.
developments which would eventually lower prices substantially. In
other cases, products which met physical requirements fully were not
acceptable for lack of a stamp attesting to inspection and testing in the
United States. Internal company rules, geared toward American-manu-
factured products, had to be amended so that advantage could be
taken of lower foreign prices for products of equal quality.
In electric wire and cable (SITC 693), Japan's gains in export share
were due, according to one report, both to increases in Asia's share of
world building of electric power installations and to Japan's success, by
the end of the period, in overcoming its previous handicap of producing
only a limited range of cable sizes to the point where its range was equal
to that of the European exporters.4
Price Trends
Prices of miscellaneous metal manufactures in the United States moved
almost completely in step with those of European countries over the
whole period of our study. They rose in each period shown until 1962,
remained constant or almost constant in 1963, and then rose slightly in
1964 (Table 11.4). Only Japan showed some sharply different price
trends, with a large decline in1963, and then alarger rise in1964than
in any other country.
Price indexes constructed from domestic wholesale price data, using
4 "Electric Wire, Cable Exports Running High," Journal of Commerce, September
29, 1965.Metal Manufactures, n.e.s. 275
international trade weights, rose relative to the international price indexes
for every country listed (see Appendix F). Except for Japan, this meant
a larger rise in the indexes from wholesale prices. In other words, if
the international price indexes are at all reliable, wholesale prices of
these metal products were biased estimators of international price move-
ments for most countries, and the bias was consistently upward. Japanese
wholesale prices, in contrast, declined, while the international price index
rose. This may have been a consequence of a weakness in our data (the
international price index constructed entirely from Japanese time series
data, listed in Appendix C, fell even more than the wholesale price
index) or of the restrictions imposed by the United States on imports
of some of these products.
Price Competitiveness
The price competitiveness of the United States in this divisIon relative
to Germany and Japan was quite stable during the period for which we
have indexes (Table 11.5). Relative to the United Kingdom and the
EEC countries other than Germany, however, the U.S. price position
deteriorated.
U.S. price competitiveness indexes built up from wholesale price data
for the individual groups show a substantial improvement in the U.S.
position relative to Britain between 1957 and 1964, at a time when
the index based on international prices showed a decline (see Appendix
F). Relative to Germany, however, the two price competitiveness indexes
show virtually identical developments from 1957 to 1964. An index
Table 11.5
U.S. Price Competitiveness, Metal Manufactures, n.e.s., 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962=100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
Relative to
U.K. 105 103 105 100 100 100
I3EC 102 101 101 100 97 95
Germany 99 95 100 100 99 98
Japan NA NA 99 100 94 99
Source: Appendix D.276 Product Reports
of U.S. price competitiveness based on U.S. and Japanese wholesale price
series shows a decline from 1953 to 1963 and then a leveling off in 1964.
In the individual groups, the indexes of U.S. price competitiveness
from wholesale price data do not show any consistent relationship to
those from international prices. However, in three out of four cases of
very large divergence between the two, listed below (data from Appen-
dixes D and F and underlying data), the change in price relationships
implied by international price data was less favorable to the United
States than that implied by the wholesale price data.





SITC Country Dates Prices Prices
692U.K. 1957—64 +26% —17%
693Japan 1961—64 +4 —14
695Germany 1953—64 —8 +9
696Germany 1953—64 +3 —14
Price Levels
European price levels for metal manufactures, n.e.s., ranged between 3
and 13 per cent below U.S. prices in all the years covered in the study
(Table 11.6). The gap between American prices and those of the United
Table 11.6
Price Levels, Metal Manufactures, n.e.s., 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(U.S. for each year =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
U.S. 100 100 100 100 100 100
U.K. 97 95 97 92 92 92
EEC 97 96 97 96 93 91
Germany 90 87 92 92 91 90
Japan NA NA 74 74 69 73
Source: Appendix E.Metal Manufactures, n.e.s. 277
Kingdom, and EEC (except Germany) widened considerably between
1953 and 1964. Japanese prices were far lower than those of the other
countries, 25to30 per cent below the U.S. level in all the years for
which we have data.
Price levels among the individual groups varied considerably (see
Appendix E). Fragmentary data indicate a fairly favorable U.S. position
in SITC 691, finished structural parts and structures which covers a
wide range of degrees of fabrication. At the lower end it includes slightly
fabricated structural steel products akin to the iron and steel bars, rods,
plates, and sheets of SITC 673 or 674, with only the addition of minor
adaptations to fit them for particular jobs. At the higher end it covers
complete prefabricated structures. At least at the beginning of the period
British firms bidding on construction projects abroad were said to be at
a disadvantage relative to Continental producers in terms of the range
and quality of structural steel products available to them. Italian firms
showed particular strength in markets for electrical transmission towers,
winning a considerable number of bidding contests in foreign countries.
After the end of the period covered by this study there were accusations
by American companies that Italian successes in this country were due to
subsidies from the Italian government, and the U.S. Treasury eventually
imposed a countervailing duty against steel transmission towers from
Italy on that ground.5
In cable manufacturing (part of SITC 693), Japan was still con-
sidered a newcomer even after the end of our period and was accused
by some of selling at a loss to break into the international market.° In
copper cable, the existence of price differences among copper markets
at times favored one cable producer over another (see Chapter 10).
This type of case occurred during the wide price swings of 1966, when
British cable producers, purchasing copper at producers' prices, were
said to have a considerable advantage over German producers who had
to buy half of their copper requirements at prices 40 per cent or more
above the producers' price level.7
A British wire rope producer was accused of dumping its products in
the United States at the end of our period, but the Treasury Department
5 "Steel: Beams for the Builder," Economist, November 2, 1957; "Italy Firm Low
Bidder on Peace River Job," Journal of Commerce, August 24, 1965; "Bite for Steel,"
Economist, April 29, 1967.
6 "Electric Cable: Current Setback," Economist, December 24, 1966.
7 "BICC: A Real Cost Squeeze," ibid., April 23, 1966.278 Product Reports
dropped the case after the company agreed to raise its prices, which
were found to have been below its home market prices.8
Both the United Kingdom and the EEC countries substantially under-
sold the United States in nails, screws, nuts, etc. (SITC 694) by the
end of the period. The weakness of the United States in this group was
reflected in the difficulties of U.S. companies in, even staying in some
parts of this business in the face of foreign competition. The problems
of the U.S. steel industry in the market for nails came into the open
after the period covered by the study, but they probably began before
1964. In 1966, one large steel company announced that it was withdraw-
ing published prices for several sizes of nails in favor of negotiated prices
in view of the inroads of foreign competition, exemplified by the fact
that half of the nails sold in the United States in 1965 had been imported.
Another American steel company announced two days later that it was
abandoning nail production entirely as a result of foreign competition.
One report quoted a price difference in the United States of about 30
per cent early in 1966, very close to our margin of 31 per cent relative
to the EEC in
Only Germany showed much lower prices than the United States in
tools (SITC 695), while U.K. prices were at about the American level.
One part of the U.S. industry, in 'a brief opposing tariff reductions,
stated that foreign competition, at least in the United States, was con-
fined to high-volume metal cutting tools.1° The American producers
seemed safe on some special items within the United States for security
reasons, and were said also to have a strong competitive position in some
high-quality tools.
In cutlery (SITC 696) the fragmentary data available, which were
not adequate for publication, indicated that European prices were close
to those of the United States. Only Japan had ever enjoyed a large price
advantage over the United States.
8"Treasury Study Finds Britons Not 'Dumping' Wire Rope in the U.S.," Wall Street
Journal, September 24, 1964.
9"U.S.Steel Sets Major Revision of Prices, Including Boosts, Cuts, Dropping of
Quotes," Wall Street Journal, March 1,1966; "Jones & Laughlin Is Pulling Out of
Nail Business," ibid., March 3, 1966; "Jones & Laughlin Ends Nails Making," New
York Times, March 3,1966; "Some Rivals Expect to Follow U.S. Steel on Prices;
Changes Called a Slight Net Rise," Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1966.
10"Statementof the Metal Cutting Tool Institute in Opposition to Possible Further
Tariff Concessions on Metal Cutting Tools by the Government of the United States,"
New York, February 3, 1964, mimeo.Metal Manufactures, n.e.s. 279
Several Tariff Commission investigations of cutlery were made be-
cause of complaints by U.S. producers that they were being seriously
injured by imports. The TariffCommissionfound injury to U.S. pro-
ducers in imports of stainless-steel tableware and recommended with-
drawal of some GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade)
concessions by the United States. The report described considerable
differences in the foreign exports. Japanese exports were at the low end
of the quality scale and were made to order for U.S. importers on the
basis of designs furnished by them; the European products, on the
other hand, were frequently higher in quality than the U.S. products
and sold on the basis of distinctive design and superior finish. One U.S.
manufacturer explained his imports from Europe on the basis that high-
quality tableware was uneconomical to produce in this country because
of the high labor content involved.
As a result of these investigations, both the United States and Japan
took measures to reduce the volume of Japanese exports to the United
States. The United States withdrew the GATT concessions, and Japan
imposed its own limitation on exports. A sharp reduction in U.S. imports
then took
In scissors and shears also, a Tariff Commission investigation pointed
to a U.S. disadvantage in the higher-quality products, but not in lower-
quality ones, which required a smaller proportion of labor cost.12
In miscellaneous metal products (SITC 698) all the countries listed
had price levels more than 10 per cent below the U.S. level in 1964,
with Japan the lowest.
The price level relationships clearly do not explain all the differences
in country export shares from one group to another. For the United
Kingdom in particular, the price ratios seem to be unrelated to the
export ratios of Table 11.1. The United Kingdom does better as an
exporter of wire than one would expect from the price data but less
well in manufactures of metal n.e.s. Of course the latter group is so
heterogeneous that the price level index may well be unrepresentative.
The relationship between German and U.S. export shares fits the
price relatives much better, that is, the ratio of German exports to U.S.
exports is high where the ratio of German prices to U.S. prices is low,
and vice versa.
11 See reference in footnote 1.
12 See reference in footnote 1.280 Product Reports
Summary
In this group, which contains several items in which foreign competition
affected the U.S. as well as foreign markets, the U.S. price position
worsened by comparison with the United Kingdom and EEC countries
other than Germany, but showed little or no deterioration relative to
Germany and Japan. However, Japanese prices for most items and other
countries' prices for some were far below the U.S. level, and some of
the problems of American firms may have been a consequence of this
large price differential (thatis,a delayed reaction to earlier price
changes) rather than of contemporaneous changes in price competitive-
ness.
Disagreements between international and wholesale price data were
extensive in this division, with wholesale prices usually biased upward
and frequently showing price competitiveness movements opposite to
those in our international price data.